How prepared is the world? Identifying weaknesses in existing assessment frameworks for global health security through a One Health approach.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed faults in the way we assess preparedness and response capacities for public health emergencies. Existing frameworks are limited in scope, and do not sufficiently consider complex social, economic, political, regulatory, and ecological factors. One Health, through its focus on the links among humans, animals, and ecosystems, is a valuable approach through which existing assessment frameworks can be analysed and new ways forward proposed. Although in the past few years advances have been made in assessment tools such as the International Health Regulations Joint External Evaluation, a rapid and radical increase in ambition is required. To sufficiently account for the range of complex systems in which health emergencies occur, assessments should consider how problems are defined across stakeholders and the wider sociopolitical environments in which structures and institutions operate. Current frameworks do little to consider anthropogenic factors in disease emergence or address the full array of health security hazards across the social-ecological system. A complex and interdependent set of challenges threaten human, animal, and ecosystem health, and we cannot afford to overlook important contextual factors, or the determinants of these shared threats. Health security assessment frameworks should therefore ensure that the process undertaken to prioritise and build capacity adheres to core One Health principles and that interventions and outcomes are assessed in terms of added value, trade-offs, and cobenefits across human, animal, and environmental health systems.

Implementing an emergency risk communication campaign in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria: lessons learned.

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the WHO recommended the prioritisation of risk communication and community engagement as part of response activities in countries. This was related to the increasing spread of misinformation and its associated risks, as well as the need to promote non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) in the absence of an approved vaccine for disease prevention. The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, the national public health institute with the mandate to prevent and detect infectious disease outbreaks, constituted a multidisciplinary Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), which included NCDC staff and partners to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak. Risk communication, which also comprised crisis communication, was a pillar in the EOC. As the number of cases in Nigeria increased, the increasing spread of misinformation and poor compliance to NPIs inspired the development of the #TakeResponsibility campaign, to encourage individual and collective behavioural change and to foster a shared ownership of the COVID-19 outbreak response. Mass media, social media platforms and community engagement measures were used as part of the campaign. This contributed to the spread of messages using diverse platforms and voices, collaboration with community leaders to contextualise communication materials and empowerment of communication officers at local levels through training, for increased impact. Despite the challenges faced in implementing the campaign, lessons such as the use of data and a participatory approach in developing communications campaigns for disease outbreaks were documented. This paper describes how a unique communication campaign was developed to support the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Impact of a Newly Established Revolving Outbreak Investigation Fund on Timeliness of Response to Public Health Emergencies in Nigeria.

Timely access to emergency funding has been identified as a bottleneck for outbreak response in Nigeria. In February 2019, a new revolving outbreak investigation fund (ROIF) was established by the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC). We abstracted the date of NCDC notification, date of verification, and date of response for 25 events that occurred prior to establishing the fund (April 2017 to August 2019) and for 8 events that occurred after establishing the fund (February to October 2019). The median time to notification (1 day) and to verification (0 days) did not change after establishing the ROIF, but the median time to response significantly decreased, from 6 days to 2 days (P = .003). Response to disease outbreaks was accelerated by access to emergency funding with a clear approval process. We recommend that the ROIF should be financed by the national government through budget allocation. Finally, development partners can provide financial support for the existing fund and technical assistance for protocol development toward financial accountability and sustainability.